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Time To Move On: The California Parole Board's
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Rachel F. Cotton*
All my [parole] denials are based on the severity of the crime. I cannot change
what I did 2o years ago.
- Johnny Lira, California Men's Colony, San Luis Obispo'
INTRODUCTION
In theory, parole is a possibility for tens of thousands of California inmates;
in practice, it has been an illusion. California's parole system releases a tiny
number of inmates each year, transforming most indeterminate sentences with
the possibility of parole into sentences of life-without-parole.2 As recently as the
1980s, approximately 20% of California inmates with indeterminate life sen-
tences received parole.' Since then, the proportion of inmates paroled has de-
creased dramatically to less than 1%, 4 compounding problems of severe prison
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2009; Brown University, B.A. 2004.
1. California's Prisoners Tell How They See the System, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 2000, at
5.
2. This Comment addresses discretionary parole decisions, not the automatic
placement of all released prisoners under parole supervision. For a discussion of
automatic placement, see JEREMY TRAVIS & SARAH LAWRENCE, URBAN INST.,
CALIFORNIA'S PAROLE EXPERIMENT 6 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/CA-parole-exp.pdf.
3. California Lifers Look to Governor for Parole (National Public Radio Weekend Edi-
tion radio broadcast Mar. 16, 2008) at 1:58, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=88324577.
4. Id. at 2:42-2:58 (noting that Governor Gray Davis released only eight lifers during
his four-year term, and Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger has approved parole for
more than forty lifers annually since his election in 2003); California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Caseload Statistics (2007), http://www.cdcr.ca
.gov/ReportsResearch/caseload_stats.html (last visited Oct. 15, 20o8) (reporting
that 4498 lifer hearings were held in 2003).
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overcrowding.' Fearing the political consequences of releasing convicted of-
fenders, recent governors have appointed "tough on crime" parole board mem-
bers who are unlikely to grant parole.6 In 2006, the Bureau of Parole Hearings
("parole board" or "board") rejected 99.5% of parole applications from eligible
inmates.7 Even when the board approves parole, the Governor can-and fre-
quently does-reverse the decision.' Typically, the board and Governor rely on
the commitment offense to deny parole, regardless of the offender's rehabilita-
tion and good prison behavior. This Comment explores the due process impli-
cations of using the commitment offense as a basis for parole denials. It exam-
ines recent California Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases and argues that
parole decisions should weigh the commitment offense less heavily than reha-
bilitative progress after the expiration of the minimum sentence term.
I. DISCRETIONARY PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA
In 1977, California adopted its current sentencing system, mandating de-
terminate sentencing for most offenses,9 but preserving indeterminate sentenc-
ing for certain serious ones." Indeterminate sentences typically range from a
5- California's thirty-three adult prisons, designed for about ioo,ooo inmates, cur-
rently hold 159,000. Judge Orders Schwarzenegger To Testify on Prisons, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 14, 20o8, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi
?f=/n/a/20o8/o8/13/state/nioloolD89.DTL&tsp=i. The problem has become so se-
vere that a hearing was scheduled for November 20o8 to determine whether over-
crowding is causing unconstitutionally poor prison health care. See Michael Roth-
feld, Prison Overcrowding Negotiations Get 30 More Days, L.A. TIMES, May 31,
20o8, at B8.
6. See, e.g., Julia Reynolds, Parole Board Members Feel Pressure: Those Asked To Re-
sign Deny That They're Soft on Crime, MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, Oct. 9, 2007,
at Ai (suggesting that Governor Schwarzenegger asked parole board members to
resign because of their willingness to grant parole).
7- Andy Furillo, Lifers Seek Court Allies in Fight with State for Parole, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Dec. 1o, 2007, at Ai.
8. Editorial, Doors Closing for Lifer-Again, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 15, 2005, at B4; Robert
Salladay, Governor's Race: Gray Davis / Democrat / Profile, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
27, 2002, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/
archive/2002/1O/27/MN59709.DTL.
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170 (a)(i) (West 2004) (declaring "determinate sentences
fixed by statute" to be California's penal scheme). See generally April Kestell
Cassou & Brian Taugher, Determinate Sentencing in California: The New Numbers
Game, 9 PAC. L.J. 5 (1978) (providing the legislative history of the 1977 overhaul of
California's sentencing system).
1o. These crimes include first degree murder without a special circumstance, at-
tempted first degree murder, conspiracy to commit first degree murder, second
degree murder, kidnapping, and certain repeat offenses. See CAL. PENAL CODE
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minimum term up to life imprisonment, with the parole board determining the
release date." Approximately 17% of California's inmates are currently serving
an indeterminate life sentence. 2
The possibility of parole serves important public interests. It provides in-
mates with an incentive to rehabilitate and build the skills necessary for success-
ful re-entry into their communities. Release contingent on good behavior also
encourages inmate compliance with prison rules.'3 Perhaps recognizing these
considerations, the California legislature mandated that the parole board "shall
normally" grant parole,' 4 unless "consideration of the public safety requires a
lengthier period of incarceration for [the] individual."15 The board may con-
sider any available information when determining suitability for parole, with
the original offense representing just one of many factors. 6 If the board con-
§§ 190, 190.05, 209, 217.1 (West 2008); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 182, 664, 667.51, 667.7
(West 1999 & Supp. 2008).
II. Indeterminate sentence statutes exist in two forms: most specify a minimum sen-
tence term, while others merely assign life imprisonment with the possibility of
parole. See People v. Jefferson, 980 P.2d 441, 445 (Cal. 1999). If a sentence includes
a minimum term, the prisoner must serve at least that term, although "good
time" credits sometimes can be subtracted. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3046, 3049 (West
2000 & Supp. 20o8). Other crimes, like torture and kidnapping, have no specified
minimum sentence. Id. §§ 2o6.1, 209 (West 2008). For these crimes, prisoners
must serve at least seven years. Id. § 3046(a)(1) (West 2000).
12. LEGIs. ANALYST'S OFFICE, JUDICIAL & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at D-7o (20o6), avail-
able at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis-20o6/crim-justice/crimjust-anlo6.pdf.
13. American Probation and Parole Association, Discretionary Parole (2002),
http://www.appa-net.org/about/ps/discretionaryparole.htm (last visited Oct. 15,
20o8).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041 (a) (West 20o8) (emphasis added); see also id. § 3041(b)
(stating "[t]he panel or board shall set a release date ....") (emphasis added).
15. Id. § 3041(b).
16. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2402(b) (2005). The relevant regulations list circum-
stances tending to show unsuitability and suitability for parole, including "an es-
pecially heinous, atrocious or cruel" commitment offense, previous violence, un-
stable social history, sadistic sexual offenses, psychological factors, and
institutional behavior. Id. § 2402(c)(1)-(6); see also id. § 2402(d)(1)-(9) (indicating
circumstances tending to show suitability for parole, such as no juvenile record,
stable social history, signs of remorse, motivation for crime, Battered Woman
Syndrome, lack of criminal history, age, understanding and plans for future, and
institutional behavior).
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cludes that an inmate is suitable for parole, it must then set a release date."7 The
board's decision is subject to the Governor's review."
In practice, reliance on the commitment offense has swallowed the statu-
tory mandate that parole "normally" should be granted. A recent judicial review
of California parole decisions found that every parole application was denied at
some point based on the nature of the original offense, 9 supporting oft-voiced
charges of an unwritten no-parole policy for indeterminately sentenced in-
mates. ° Denying parole solely on the basis of the commitment offense raises
serious due process concerns, as the California Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit have begun to realize.
II. DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS AND THE ROLE OF THE COMMITMENT OFFENSE
The U.S. Supreme Court famously decreed that "[tihere is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.... Prisoners
may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."'"
Indeed, the constitutional right to "due process" has long been the source of
important protections for inmates.2
A due process violation occurs when the state: (i) deprives an individual of
life, liberty, or property; and (2) denies adequate procedural protections.23
Given the mandatory language in California's parole statute, 4 every indetermi-
17. Id. § 2403(a). This release date is set through an administrative matrix, which uses
the circumstances of the crime to determine an appropriate base term. The base
term is calculated based on the category of crime, prior relationship to victim, vic-
tim contribution, and the resulting physical trauma. Id.
18. CAL. CONST. art. V, § 8(b); see also In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 207 (Cal. 2002)
("[Tlhe Governor's review is limited to the same considerations that inform the
Board's decision.").
19. In re Criscione, No. 71614 at 9 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 30, 2007). The court reviewed
a random sample of 2690 cases decided in a thirteen-month period.
20. See LEGIs. ANALYST'S OFFICE, JUDICIARY & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at D-3 to -4, D-56
to -62 (2000), available at http://www.lao.ca.gov/analysis2ooo/crim-justice/
crimjust-anloo.pdf.
21. Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
22. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487 (198o) ("[T]he involuntary transfer of
a... prisoner to a mental hospital implicates a liberty interest that is protected by
the Due Process Clause."); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (reviewing
inmate's due process rights at disciplinary hearing); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557 (recog-
nizing inmate's liberty interest in "good time" credits).
23. E.g., Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 91o, 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McQuillion v. Dun-
can, 306 F.3d 895, 900 (gth Cir. 2002)).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 3041(b) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008).
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nately sentenced prisoner has a liberty interest in parole,25 commencing
"upon... incarceration."" Thus, any parole denial or finding of unsuitability
must comport with due process. The second prong of the due process test re-
quires that "some evidence" support the parole decision. 7 Although the "some
evidence" threshold is low, it prevents the state from interfering with a liberty
interest "without support or [in an] otherwise arbitrary" manner2"
The legal controversy over the appropriate role of the commitment offense
in parole denials centers on when commitment offenses can satisfy the "some
evidence" standard. Previous California Supreme Court decisions permitted pa-
role denials based solely on the commitment offense if it was "particularly egre-
gious"2 9 or "especially callous and cruel."3 This led to confusion over whether
"some evidence" had to support the egregiousness of the crime or the inmate's
public safety risk, per the statute. And, despite judicial guidance that the cir-
cumstances of the offense had to exceed "the minimum necessary to sustain a
conviction" for the crime to justify a parole denial,3 the parole board labeled
almost every offense as sufficiently callous to deny parole.
In August 2008, the California Supreme Court began to restore inmates'
parole rights by limiting the use of the commitment offense to support parole
denials.3 2 Its opinion in In re Lawrence clarified that the only permissible reason
to deny parole is current dangerousness, adding that the nature of the offense
"does not, in every case, provide evidence that the inmate is a current threat to
public safety."33 The court held that when evidence of an inmate's rehabilitation
and parole suitability is "overwhelming," and "the only evidence related to un-
suitability is the gravity of the commitment offense... [which] is temporally
remote and mitigated by circumstances indicating the conduct is unlikely to
recur," then "the immutable circumstance that the commitment offense
25. See McQuillion, 306 F.3d at 9o1; see also Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373
(1987) (holding that mandatory language in parole statutes creates a protected lib-
erty interest).
26. Biggs, 334 F.3d at 915.
27. See Sass v. Cal. Rd. of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1129 (9th Cir. 2006); Jancsek v.
Or. Bd. of Parole, 833 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9 th Cir. 1987). California's statutes safeguard
an inmate's ability to be heard at parole hearings and ascertain the reasons behind
adverse decisions, which the second prong of the due process test also requires.
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 3041.5, 3041.7 (West 2000).
28. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (noting that the "some evidence"
standard assures that "the record is not so devoid of evidence that the findings of
the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary").
29. In re Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d 174, 222 (Cal. 2002).
30. In re Dannenberg, 104 P.3d 783, 785 (Cal. 2005).
31. Rosenkrantz, 59 P.3d at 222.
32. In re Lawrence, No. A17 4924 (Cal. Aug. 21, 2008).
33. Id. at 36.
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involved aggravated conduct does not provide 'some evidence' inevitably sup-
porting the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public
safety. '3 4 Thus, the court signaled that the board no longer could conflate a hei-
nous crime with public safety risk, and that lower courts henceforth had to
scrutinize board determinations that the inmate still posed a danger.35 More
specifically, the court stated:
[A]lthough the Board and the Governor may rely upon the aggravated
circumstances of the commitment offense as a basis for a decision
denying parole, the aggravated nature of the crime does not in and of
itself provide some evidence of current dangerousness to the public
unless the record also establishes that something in the prisoner's pre-
or post-incarceration history, or his or her current demeanor and
mental states, indicates that the implications regarding the prisoner's
dangerousness that derive from his or her commission of the
commitment offense remain probative to the statutory determination
of a continuing threat to public safety.36
The Lawrence court reached these conclusions based on state due process
grounds and statutory construction.17 Nevertheless, the decision mirrors recent
Ninth Circuit cases involving federal due process concerns, which suggested
that the commitment offense should not always constitute "some evidence.""3
These cases recognized that relying solely on a commitment offense to deny pa-
role inaccurately estimates an inmate's current public safety risk and does not
account for an inmate's rehabilitative progress. 39 In particular, the Ninth Cir-
cuit appears to understand that the predictive value of past events, like the
commitment offense, diminishes over time. As one district court stated, relying
on the commitment offense "as an indicator of [an inmate's] dangerousness
may be reasonable for some period of time... [but] continued reliance on
[it] ... violates due process because... [the] offense has become such an unre-
34. Id. at 3.
35. Research confirms the California Supreme Court's intuition that a heinous crime
is not necessarily proof of a future public safety risk. For instance, the U.S. De-
partment of Justice found that homicide offenders have the lowest re-arrest rate of
any other serious offender. PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN
1994, at 1 (2002); see also NAT'L PAROLE BD., GOV'T OF CAN., REPEAT HOMICIDE
OFFENCES COMMITTED By OFFENDERS UNDER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION (sug-
gesting that those convicted of homicide are unlikely to murder again) (on file
with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
36. In re Lawrence, No. A174924 , slip op. at 36 (Cal. Aug. 21, 20o8).
37. There may be some difference between state and federal due process in this con-
text, but the court does not address it.
38. See Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007); Biggs v. Terhune, 334 F.3d 91o (9th
Cir. 2003).
39. See, e.g., Biggs, 334 F.3d at 916-17.
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liable predictor of his present and future dangerousness that it does not satisfy
the 'some evidence' standard. '"
4 °
While the California Supreme Court sought to inject new life into the oth-
erwise moribund possibility of parole, its decision lacks the specificity needed to
provide firm guidance to parole boards and courts. Given the politicization of
parole decisions and the reluctance of the board and the Governor to grant pa-
role,41 it is unclear whether Lawrence can produce the impact on the parole sys-
tem that the court intended. While the decision insists that the parole board
carefully scrutinize an inmate's rehabilitation and the continued relevance of
the commitment offense, it is possible that the board may continue to deny pa-
role by simply nodding to the decision's subjective and nebulous language. Al-
most anything arguably "indicates that... the commitment offense remain[s]
probative .. of a continuing threat to public safety. ' 42 And, at what point is a
commitment offense sufficiently "temporally remote?" The court may have re-
sisted more precise language because of the fact-specific nature of parole deci-
sions, or because predictions of future behavior are inherently difficult to tie to
fixed rules. However, the decision lacks the specificity necessary to overcome
the predictable (and demonstrated) reticence of the parole board to amend its
practices. Rather than hope that the lower courts will fill in the details necessary
to effect real change, the legislature should take steps to buttress Lawrence.
III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
Action by the California legislature is necessary to reinforce the California
Supreme Court's declaration that the parole board must cease automatically
denying parole based on the original crime. State legislators should enact laws
reaffirming the importance of rehabilitation by insisting that the parole board
not rely indefinitely on the original offense to deny parole. Further, it should
resolve the ongoing question of when the original offense must cede to evidence
of rehabilitation. The most practical solution would be to accept the Ninth Cir-
cuit's suggestion that the expiration of the minimum prison sentence may be
the most suitable time.
In Irons v. Carey,43 the Ninth Circuit implied the commitment offense alone
might not constitute "some evidence" after an inmate had served his minimum
sentence. 44 The court concluded that reliance on the commitment offense to
deny parole comports with due process, but the court explicitly limited its hold-
ing to inmates deemed unsuitable prior to the expiration of their minimum sen-
40. Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1O63, 1O84 (C.D. Cal. 20o6).
41. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
42. In re Lawrence, No. A174924, slip op. at 26 (Cal. Aug. 21, 20o8).
43. Irons v. Carey, 505 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2007).
44. Id. at 853-54.
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tences.45 Although the court did not explain the significance of the minimum
term in parole decisions, it signaled a useful benchmark for judging when the
commitment offense should weigh less heavily than rehabilitative progress. The
minimum sentence represents the amount of punishment that the legislature
has deemed necessary based on considerations of retribution and deterrence. 46
Any subsequent incarceration should be guided solely by public safety concerns,
for example, whether the prisoner is likely to reoffend. Evidence of post-offense
conduct, including steps toward rehabilitation, should receive more weight at
this point in the parole calculus than the original crime. It is important to note
that eliminating the commitment offense from the suitability determination af-
ter an inmate serves the minimum sentence does not render that offense irrele-
vant, because it dictates the actual parole release date set through the parole
board's administrative matrix. 47 Currently, the commitment offense is "double-
counted," factoring into both the suitability determination and the release date
calculation. 4s
The legislature should revise the California Penal Code in two ways. First, if
the board or the Governor uses the commitment offense to deny parole, the leg-
islature should require a precise explanation of why the offense still has deter-
minative value in order to facilitate inmate challenges to the decision. Second,
the legislature should state that, after the minimum sentence expires, there
should be a presumption that the original offense no longer bears on parole
suitability or current dangerousness. The presumption should only be over-
come if the record shows scant evidence of rehabilitation or other truly excep-
tional circumstances. The presumption also should become stronger with the
passage of time.49
45. Id. at 853 ("All... we hold today.., is that ... due process was not violated when
these prisoners were deemed unsuitable for parole prior to the expiration of their
minimum terms.") (emphasis added).
46. See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 537, 559 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("When the
Legislature sets an indeterminate maximum term with a fixed minimum term, the
latter can be viewed as setting the period of imprisonment deemed necessary to
satisfy [retribution and deterrence], while the justification for continued
imprisonment beyond that fixed minimum depends on the need for continued
incapacitation of the offender.").
47. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 2403(a) (2008).
48. See Daniel Weiss, Note, California's Inequitable Parole System: A Proposal To Rees-
tablish Fairness, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1592 (2005).
49. Given the politicization of the Governor's role in the parole process, it might be
preferable to eliminate the Governor's review entirely. But, the Governor's power
to review parole decisions comes from Proposition 89, a voter-passed constitu-
tional amendment. See Statewide Measures on Tuesday's Ballot, L.A. TIMEs, Nov.
6, 1988, at 27. The California Constitution does not normally permit the state leg-
islature to amend voter initiatives. CAL. CONST. art. II, § lo(c). Therefore, the re-
moval of the Governor from the parole process would require another voter ini-
tiative.
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By emphasizing post-conviction factors after completion of the minimum
sentence term, the parole board can reward deserving, genuinely reformed in-
mates. Reducing reliance on the commitment offense may also force a more
thorough review of prisoners' records, generating more accurate parole deci-
sions that deny release for truly dangerous offenders while incentivizing
"earned" release for selected inmates.5 0 This mechanism could increase the
number of deserving parolees and ease some of the pressure on California's
overcrowded prisons.
CONCLUSION
By stating that the parole board should "normally" grant parole, the Cali-
fornia legislature expressed a belief that few offenders should remain incarcer-
ated beyond their parole eligibility date. Unfortunately, reliance on the com-
mitment offense contravened that mandate, and illusory promises of parole
have proved cruel to inmates, expensive to taxpayers, and destabilizing to pris-
ons. But while the commitment offense will never change, inmates can-and
do-reform. The California Supreme Court recently recognized that due proc-
ess requires parole decisions to account for rehabilitative progress. The legisla-
ture should reinforce that message, adding a bright line temporal threshold to
ensure implementation of the court's directive.
50. Joan Petersilia, Parole and Prisoner Reentry in the United States, 26 CRIME & JUST.
479, 480-81 (2000).

